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The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses
Abner S. Greene'
When the Supreme Court held in Employment Division v. Smith' that the
Free Exercise Clause does not protect religious practices from otherwise valid
laws that incidentally burden those practices, it followed a particular theory of
democratic politics. That some laws might unintentionally burden certain
religious practices is, said the Court, an "unavoidable consequence of
democratic government [that] must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself."2 The Court was certainly right in one sense:
To claim that conscientious objection to an otherwise valid law should exempt
one from that law is to claim that one's values should prevail over the values
chosen by the majority. Reading the Constitution to require such exemptions
as a matter of right would indeed render each conscience a law unto itself.
Although not stated explicitly, the Court's theory of democratic politics
recognizes that there will be winners and losers in the political marketplace,
where value competes against value for adoption as law. So long as one is able
to participate in that competition, one cannot claim a constitutional right to
avoid obedience merely because one's values were defeated by a competing
set of values that one finds objectionable. Losers as well as winners are bound
by the outcome of an open democratic political process.
By applying this theory of democratic politics in Smith, however, the Court
revealed that it does not take religious values seriously as a special source of
conscientious objection. In fact, neither the Justices nor commentators have
articulated a theory of the religion clauses that accounts for the proper role of
religion in politics. Without paying much attention to this issue, the Warren
and Burger Courts read the Establishment Clause to invalidate legislation with
f Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to the Russell 1.
Parsons Faculty Research Fund and the Harry Kalven Jr. Memorial Fund for financial assistance. Thanks
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the University of Chicago Milwaukee Alumni Luncheon. Many people have contributed to my thinking
about this Article, none more significantly than my colleague Michael McConnell, to whom I owe a special
debt of gratitude. Thanks also for helpful comments to Al Alschuler, Mary Becker, Dana Chasin, Ned
Foley, Maggie Hume, Judy Greene, Elena Kagan, Jeremy Karpatkin, Jessica Kom, Larry Lessig, Geoff
Miller, Randy Moss, John Nagle, Clarence Pollard, Richard Posner, Josh Rosenkranz, Matt Shapiro, Julie
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1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that general state law regarding controlled substances may be applied
to sacramental use of peyote in Native American Church, and that state may deny unemployment benefits
to people discharged from job for such use).
2. Id. at 890.
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a predominant religious purpose,3 while reading the Free Exercise Clause to
give individuals a prima facie right" to exemption from laws that burden their
religious practices.5 But this doctrine often was accused of being internally
inconsistent, on the theory that religious exemptions infringe Establishment
Clause values. Some scholars have defended the doctrine.6 Others have tried
to change it: One group favors a strong reading of the Establishment Clause
but opposes Free Exercise Clause exemptions,7 while another group supports
the exemptions but also argues for a weaker reading of the Establishment
Clause.8 Neither supporters nor critics of the doctrine, however, have
demonstrated that religion is special in a way that invalidates the theory of
democratic politics relied on in Smith. This failure allowed the Smith Court to
conclude that there is no good constitutional reason to privilege religious
values by requiring an exemption from otherwise valid law for people who
hold those values. 9 Equipped with Smith's implicit predicate that religious
values can compete equally with secular values in the political arena, the
Rehnquist Court is in position to validate legislation backed by a
predominantly religious purpose, thus accomplishing a complete inversion of
prior doctrine.
This Article seeks to explain the relationship between the religion clauses
in a way that accounts for the proper role of religion in politics, and in so
doing offers a new defense of the embattled religion-clause doctrine of the
3. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
590-91 (1987); infra Part I(A)(3).
4. The right is only prima facie because the government's interest in universal adherence to the law
in question might be strong enough to outweigh the claimant's interest in not obeying the law. Thus, a
balancing test is necessary. Throughout this Article, although I refer to "exemptions," I am discussing the
prima facie right to such exemptions. How the government's interest should be balanced against the
claimant's interest is a question I shall not address here.
5. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). There
is good, though not undisputed, historical evidence that the Free Exercise Clause was intended to provide
religious exemptions from otherwise valid law. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). But see Philip A. Hamburger,
A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915
(1992) (challenging McConnell's analysis). I take no position on the McConnell/Hamburger debate. Instead,
my argument will be based on an interpretation of the religion clauses that fits with a widely accepted
premise of liberal democratic theory as embodied in our Constitution, which I discuss briefly in the text
below.
6. See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195 (1992).
7. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L.
REv. 308 (1991) [hereinafter Marshall, Defense]; William P. Marshall, The Case Against the
Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 363 (1989) [hereinafter Marshall,
Case Against].
8. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115
(1992).
9. Smith left open Free Exercise Clause challenges to laws that seek to burden religion, distinguishing
such laws from laws that incidentally burden religion. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78. This Term's Free
Exercise Clause case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla.
1989), aff'd, 936 F.2d 586 (lth Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992), offers the Court an
excellent opportunity to invalidate an ordinance that was intended to burden religion.
1612 [Vol. 102: 1611
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Warren and Burger Courts.' In brief, I argue that the Establishment Clause
should be read to forbid enacting legislation for the express purpose of
advancing the values believed to be commanded by religion." Precisely
because religion should be excluded from politics in this way, my argument
continues, the Free Exercise Clause requires the recognition of religious faith
as a ground for exemption from legal obligation. Thus, I reject Smith's implicit
political predicate that all values may be offered for majority support to be
enacted into law. If the Establishment Clause should be read to place a special
burden on the role of religious values in politics, then those values should
receive special treatment when they conflict with the values adopted by the
legislature. Reading the Free Exercise Clause to require exemptions from law
neither favors religion nor renders religious conscience "a law unto itself."
Rather, these exemptions are merely the appropriate remedy for the damage
that precluding religious values from grounding law causes religious people.
This political calculus of the religion clauses rests on what I believe to be
a widely accepted premise of liberal democratic theory-namely, that the
legitimacy of legal obligation turns, in part, on the ability of citizens to offer
their values for adoption as law. Many elements of our Constitution rest on
this premise: The Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press Clauses, the
Petition Clause, and the various provisions regarding voting rights all embody
our constitutional commitment to unencumbered political participation as a
predicate for legitimate governmental coercion. To be sure, we accept many
departures from the norm of full political participation. But to base legislation
expressly on a source of value to which some citizens lack access, or to refuse
to base legislation on a source of value that some citizens hold dear, is a
significant exclusion that undermines the legitimacy of the government's claim
to obedience.
10. Some scholars properly have suggested that Free Exercise Clause exemptions do not privilege
religion but rather offset the special Establishment Clause hurdle that religion must face. But a theory of
how this offset works, and how such an offset might invalidate Smith's implicit theory of democratic
politics, has not been articulated. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and
a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 719, 729 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Update]
(arguing that "the government must 'single out' religion in both free exercise and establishment contexts,"
and that supposed benefits from Free Exercise Clause exemptions "are balanced by the disadvantages to
religion from the Establishment Clause"); Michael NV. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 329 (1991) (citing "the symmetrical character of the free exercise and establishment
principles" to rebut claim that free-exercise exemptions constitute "favoritism" for religion); Sullivan, supra
note 6, at 206 (describing the Establishment Clause as placing a "disability" on religion); id. at 222 ("The
price of this truce is the banishment of religion from the public square, but the reward should be allowing
religious subcultures to withdraw from regulation insofar as compatible with peaceful diarchic
coexistence.").
I1. A note about terminology: Throughout this Article, I use a variety of terms to describe the values
believed to be commanded by one's religion. I refer interchangeably to religious values, beliefs, premises,
and commands. Although in another essay the differences among these terms might matter, here they do
not. Or at least I hope they will not matter to the comprehensibility and validity of the arguments I
advance.
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Both aspects of this Article address this problem. The Establishment
Clause, I argue in Part I, protects against the exclusion of nonbelievers from
meaningful political debate by making it unconstitutional to base law expressly
on religious faith. This solution, however, excludes religious believers from
full political participation. I argue in Part II that the Free Exercise Clause
mitigates the effects of that exclusion. Finally, I explain in Part II wh the
Constitution should not be read to require exemptions for claims of secular
conscience.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST ENACTING
RELIGIOUS FAITH INTO LAW
My central claim in this Part is that the Establishment Clause, properly
understood, prohibits enacting religious faith into law, by which I mean
enacting legislation for the express purpose of advancing the values believed
to be commanded by religion. Although the Court and many commentators
have accepted the notion that laws must have a dominant secular purpose,
there is still considerable controversy over the role of religious values in
animating the passage of law. I first discuss, in Part I(A), what makes religious
values different from secular ones and justifies at least their partial exclusion
from the political process. I focus on what seems to be their chief
distinguishing characteristic-their reference to an extrahuman source of value.
Basing law expressly on values whose authority cannot be shared by citizens
as citizens, but only by those who take a leap of faith, excludes those who do
not share the faith from meaningful participation in political discourse and
from meaningful access to the source of normative authority predicating law.
Requiring that secular analogues be found for religious values, and demanding
that the secular purpose be dominant rather than merely present and express
rather than merely plausible, ensures that political debate remains a discussion
of politics and not religion, and hence that nonreligious people have
meaningful access to the terms of the political debate. I next seek to explain,
in Part I(B), why legislation that accommodates religious practices does not
violate the Establishment Clause as I read it. Finally, in Part I(C), I address
some important objections to my view of the role of religious values in
politics.
A. The Special Problem Posed by Religious Faith: Reference to an
Extrahuman Source of Value
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the Establishment Clause is
violated if legislation is backed by a "dominant motive to impose or promote
1614 [Vol. 102: 1611
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a particular religious view.' '12 But the role of religious purpose in the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence appears open to question,13 and the proper
relationship between religious values and political outcomes is hotly debated
in the academy. Although they differ significantly over questions of degree,
Franklin Gamwell,14  Kent Greenawalt,' 5  Stephen Pepper, 16  Michael
Perry,17 and Kathleen Sullivan'8 all have supported the view that it is
improper to enact legislation for a religious purpose. Steven Smith,' 9 David
Smolin,20 and (to a somewhat lesser degree) Michael McConnell2  have
taken the contrary view.
12. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 245 (1988); see Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980) (per curiam); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). In these cases invalidating legislation under
the Establishment Clause, the Court has variously identified the problem as being that of a religious reason,
justification, purpose, motive, objective, or intention. I will generally refer to a law's "purpose." See infra
Part I(A)(3) (discussing these cases).
13. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-63 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and
dissenting); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is unclear whether Justice Kennedy's views
have shifted between Allegheny and the recent Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), in which he wrote
the Court's opinion holding unconstitutional a prayer at a public-school graduation. Lee indicates that
Kennedy is especially concerned about coercion in the school-prayer setting, a concern that would not carry
over to many of the problems I discuss here.
14. See Franklin Gamwell, Religion and Reason in American Politics, 2 J.L. & RELIGION 325, 338-39
(1984) (arguing that it is permissible to introduce religious convictions into public debate, so long as those
doing so "defend their convictions by appeal to considerations that can be assessed by all members of the
public").
15. See GREENAWALT, supra note 12, at 16-21 (saying that government may not "directly aim" at
furthering religious beliefs); id. at 20 (noting that law must "rest on some secular objective").
16. See Stephen Pepper, A Brief for the Free Exercise Clause, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 323, 332 (1989)
("The establishment clause makes sense... as a guarantor of secular governmenL").
17. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER 105-12 (1991). According to Perry, "public
accessibility" is a prerequisite to ecumenical political dialogue, which can include religious as well as
secular values. Perry would preclude appeals based on experiences, premises, people, or institutions that
have authority only within the confines of a religious community. The Establishment Clause, he says,
forbids endorsement of a particular religious faith, and proper ecumenical political dialogue depends un
translating religious faith into secular premises.
18. See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 197 (arguing that Establishment Clause sets up "affirmative'establishment' of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes"); id. at 197-98 ("Religious
teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may
be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms. Religious grounds for resolving public moral
disputes would rekindle inter-denominational strife that the Establishment Clause extinguished."); id. at 198
("Public affairs may no longer be conducted as the strongest faith would dictate. Minority religions gain
from the truce not in the sense that their faiths now may be translated into public policy, but in the sense
that no faith may be.").
19. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1991) [hereinafter Smith, Rise and Fall]; Steven D. Smith, Separation and the
"Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955 (1989) [hereinafter Smith,
Separation].
20. See David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A
Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1991) (reviewing PERRY, supra note 17).
21. See McConnell, Update, supra note 10, at738-41. McConnell supports less clearly than Smith and
Smolin the view that laws may be enacted to advance religious faith, without the need to find any secular
analogues for religious values. In addition to the writings I discuss in Part I(C)(2), McConnell has also
written that requiring "a secular purpose for all government action" is "right and proper," and that "[t]he
absence of a strong secular justification" might be evidence of a program favoring religion. McConnell,
supra note 8, at 128, 144.
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Two issues are crucial to this debate: whether religious values are different
in kind from secular values, and, if so, whether that difference should matter
for Establishment Clause analysis. As Sanford Levinson puts the question,
Why doesn't liberal democracy give everyone an equal right, without
engaging in any version of epistemic abstinence, to make his or her
arguments, subject, obviously, to the prerogative of listeners to reject
the arguments should they be unpersuasive (which will be the case,
almost by definition, with arguments that are not widely accessible or
are otherwise marginal)?22
Unless religious belief is different from secular belief in a relevant way, we
cannot logically exclude religious premises from grounding law unless we wish
to exclude secular premises as well.
1. The Uniqueness of Religion
Three standard efforts to distinguish religious belief from secular belief
stress that religion is divisive, that religion relies on a source of authority other
than the state, and that religion is not provable. But each of these arguments
proves too much; in each case, secular as well as religious belief appears to fit
the criterion. 23 There is a fourth criterion, however, that distinguishes the two
22. Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REv. 2061, 2077
(1992) (reviewing PERRY, supra note 17); see also Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and
Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE LJ. 977, 995 (discussing possibility of "a liberal politics that
would acknowledge and genuinely cherish the religious beliefs that for many Americans provide their
fundamental worldview," in part by "meeting policy proposals on their own grounds, rather than dismissing
them because of the religious motivations of their supporters").
23. Thus, consider: (1) "Religion is divisive." To be sure, religion often has been divisive, leading to
sectarian conflict and persecution. But there also have been many divisions over political values not
considered religious, and many of these divisions also have caused strife. The organized nature of some
religions might make it more likely that groups of people will have power to act against dissenters, but
there are plenty of organized nonreligious groups that take controversial political positions.
Now, consider: (2) "Religion is based on an authority that competes with civil authority without being
accepted by all as an authority." It is true that for many, religion is not merely a choice but a compelling
source of authority that one feels obliged to follow. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND
REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
298, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973); John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious
Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779, 791 (1986); Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech
in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739, 778 (1986); McConnell, supra note 5, at 1497; Geoffrey
R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 WM1. & MARY L. REV.
985, 993 (1986). But it is no less true that many holders of secular beliefs feel equally obligated by the
force of those beliefs to obey them, even if their injunction conflicts with that of the state. See MILTON R.
KONVITz, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 98-106 (1968); Garvey,
supra, at 792-97; Marshall, Case Against, supra note 7, at 387.
Finally, consider: (3) "Religion is ultimately based on faith, which is nonprovable." As Michael
McConnell has explained, one of the reasons the Framers chose to protect religious and not secular
conscience was the notion that religious faith is special because incapable of proof. McConnell, supra note
5, at 1498. Though this notion may have animated the Framers, Kent Greenawalt and Michael Perry devote
substantial portions of their books dealing with religion and politics to rebutting the idea. See
GREENAWALT, supra note 12, at 63, 65, 146-56; PERRY, supra note 17, at 55, 84, 94-95, 120-21. According
1616
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sorts of belief, and that is widely accepted by scholars as providing a coherent
definition of "religion." After I describe and defend this criterion, I will show
why it should matter for Establishment Clause analysis.
Although secular as well as religious belief might be divisive, might rely
on a nongovernmental source of authority, and might not be provable, only
religious belief involves reference to an extrahuman source of value, of
normative authority.24 To be sure, I am defining "religious belief' in this
way; I do not purport to divine a "natural" meaning of "religious belief." But
there is reason to think that when most people speak of "religion," they are
thinking of some such "reference out," some such reliance on a source of
normative authority that is not based solely on human reason or experience. By
far the most common criterion mentioned by scholars as definitive of"religion" is a reference beyond human experience to an extrahuman source of
value.as
to Greenawalt and Perry, we must be radically skeptical of finding provably correct answers, in either the
religious or the secular realm. At some point, both religious and secular claims are based on premises
accepted as articles of faith. See also DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 76-77
(1986) (summarizing William James's statement of conditions under which it is reasonable to believe
something that cannot be proven, and noting that these conditions are "applicable to both secular and
nonsecular belief"); Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv.
579, 604 (1982) (calling it "very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish transcendental ideologies from
those commonly considered to be based on secular premises"); Marshall, Case Against, supra note 7, at
388 (observing that most types of belief and moral values-not just religious ones-have "non-rational
components," and adding that "the contentions that practical reasoning leads to an understanding of reality
and that morality may be understood through rational processes are themselves ultimately based on no more
than their own non-rational, a priori assumptions") (footnote omitted); Smith, Separation, supra note 19,
at 1008 (noting that "political decisions are inevitably grounded in evaluative judgments," and often"universally shared 'grounds of decision' do not appear to exist").
24. By "extrahuman source of value, of normative authority," I mean only those sources of value that
go beyond the personal and the communal. References to moral categories derived from reason and human
experience (including the experience of the natural world) are, by this definition, intrahuman rather than
extrahuman. I understand that for some, religion is just as "human" as any other form of belief; that is,
what characterizes their religious belief is not a leap of faith to an extrahuman source of value, but a set
of inferences derived from human experience. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 22, at 992-93. Whether the
Establishment Clause prohibits express political reliance on such "intrahuman" religious belief, and
accordingly whether the Free Exercise Clause provides exemptions for such believers, are difficult questions
that I do not address here. Cf. text accompanying notes 25-28. For purposes of the analysis in this Article,
because I am using a commonly accepted definition of religion and am not seeking to prove that this
definition exhausts the category "religion," it seems safe to agree with Kent Greenawalt that although some
claim their religious convictions are intra- rather than extrahuman, most religious belief rests on "elements
that are not subject to reasoned interpersonal evaluation." Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and
Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1019, 1032 (1990).
25. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 17, at 70-72 (saying that religion involves "[a] set of beliefs about
how one is or can be bound or connected to the world--to the 'other' and to 'nature'-and, above all, to
Ultimate Reality," and that this Ultimate Reality is "beyond all thought and speech"); George C. Freeman
III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion, " 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1520 (1983)
(arguing that founders equated religion with theism); Garvey, supra note 23, at 792-97, 798-801; Frederick
Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 678 (1992) ("Religious belief
in the Western tradition centers on a transcendent force or belief--that is, a force or belief beyond the
material, phenomenal world."); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL.
L. REV. 753, 805 (1984) (asserting that the "most plausible single-factor approach to religion is one that
is based on 'higher reality' in some broad sense"); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed
Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 240, 285-86 (1989) (identifying key to
religion as "the role that a sacred or transcendental reality plays in imposing obligations upon the religious
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One might object at the outset that the very act of defining "religion"
raises Establishment Clause problems, for there are some people who deem
their beliefs "religious" regardless of whether those beliefs would commonly
be considered religious or whether those beliefs refer to an extrahuman source
of value.26 On this view, any definition of "religion" for First Amendment
purposes that excludes what some consider to be "religion" improperly
discriminates among religions. An initial and obvious problem with this
position is that the religion clauses use the word "religion" and say that it may
not be established and that its free exercise may not be prohibited. Barring
interpretation of the term "religion" risks negating the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses as barriers to governmental action, for we would have no
way of knowing when such action is legitimate and when it is not. In assessing
the argument that each citizen should be the judge of whether her beliefs are
"religious," consider how odd it would be to say that each individual claimant
could decide whether her behavior is "speech" under the Freedom of Speech
Clause, or whether her compensation is "just" under the Takings Clause.
But I do not wish to argue that the coverage of the religion clauses is
exhausted by beliefs that refer to extrahuman sources of value. For example,
there might be reasons to invoke the Establishment Clause if a group that
looks, talks, and sounds like a traditional religion seeks government funding
for worship services, even if the object of the group's worship is not
faithful," and asserting that "[alithough not necessarily bound by any theistic precept, religious duties must
be based in the 'otherworldly' or the transcendent"); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1002 (1990) ('[Any belief about
God, the supernatural, or the transcendent, is a religious belief."); McConnell, supra note 5, at 1493 &
n.430 (describing Madison's view of religion as retaining a "distinction between transcendent authority and
personal judgment," and arguing that "[t]he historical materials uniformly equate 'religion' with belief in
God or in gods, though this can be extended without distortion to transcendent extrapersonal authorities
not envisioned in traditionally theistic terms"); McConnell, supra note 8, at 172-73 ("The essence of'religion' is that it acknowledges a normative authority independent of the judgment of the individual or
of the society as a whole."); Mark Tushnet, The Limits of the Involvement of Religion in the Body Politic,
in THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 191, 195 (James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek
Davis eds., 1991) ("A 'secular ground' (or 'secular reason') is one that does not make essential reference
to a deity; a religious ground or reason does."); John H. Yoder, Response of an Amateur Historian and a
Religious Citizen, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 415, 418 (1989) ("From within the faith story ... the concern is not
with religion, as a set of human practices, but with God, whom these practices seek to honor."); id. at 423
("[lit is inadequate to try to manage free exercise and establishment issues by excising from the picture the
concept of divine will which historically made them become issues in the first place.").
26. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356-61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (arguing
that legislation recognizing only theistic religious belief as basis for statutory exemption from military draft
violates Establishment Clause because not "neutral"); Marshall, Defense, supra note 7, at 310-11, 319-23;
Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604 (1964)
("[A]n attempt to define religion, even for purposes of increasing freedom for religions, would run afoul
of the 'establishment' clause, as excluding some religions, or even as establishing a notion respecting
religion."). For other arguments against defining "religion," though not necessarily because such definition
itself violates the Establishment Clause, see Freeman, supra note 25, at 1565 ("There simply is no essence
of religion, no single feature or set of features that all religions have in common and that distinguishes
religion from everything else."); Greenawalt, supra note 25, at 762 ("[F]or constitutional purposes, religion
should be determined by the closeness of analogy in the relevant respects between the disputed instance
and what is indisputably religion.").
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extrahuman. Furthermore, direct regulation of beliefs or practices or association
of such a group might be thought to violate the Free Exercise Clause. In short,
although I claim that the Establishment Clause prohibits enacting religious faith
into law and thus provides the predicate for Free Exercise Clause exemptions
for adherents to such faith, I do not claim that this calculus exhausts the
jurisprudence of either of the religion clauses. My goal here is the narrower
one of examining whether the Constitution ever requires exemptions from
othervise valid law for claims of conscience; my contention is that such
exemptions are required only when arguments on behalf of those claims are
not allowed as the ground of law, and that only references to an extrahuman
source of value should be so excluded.27
2. Why Religion's Uniqueness Matters
Basing law on an express reference to an extrahuman source of value
should matter for Establishment Clause analysis because such reference
effectively excludes those who don't share the relevant religious faith from
meaningful participation in the political process. Consider a law based on the
maxim "you should love your neighbor as you love yourself--a law enacting
some form of Good Samaritan obligation, say. The legislature's reliance on
that maxim might be based on express reference to facts about human behavior
and conclusions reached about the causes and effects of such behavior. In that
case, the law would not be based on a source of value beyond human
experience. Although it might be hard or impossible to "prove" these
conclusions and to "show" why they should lead to a particular law, at least
the door is left open for dissenters to seek to alter the law based on arguments
accessible to all involved. In this sense, reference to human experience can be
seen as the common denominator for political debate. If, on the other hand, the
Good Samaritan law were based expressly on the ground that God (or, more
generally, any source of value beyond human experience) commands us to love
our neighbors as ourselves,28 then dissenters are left with the options of (a)
converting to the relevant faith and thus gaining access to the source of values
animating the law, (b) arguing with the religious believers about whether they
have properly construed the commandments of their faith, or (c) persuading
those believers that their faith is "false." Unless they come to share the faith,
dissenters cannot meaningfully compete in the debate over how conclusions
from religious faith should be enacted into law.
In other words, although secular as well as religious beliefs might not be
provable, there is nonetheless a significant difference between expressly
grounding law in premises accessible to citizens as citizens, on the one hand,
27. But see the caveat to this conclusion in Part IH(D).
28. See Luke 10:25-37.
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and only to those with a particular religious faith, on the other hand. It might
be hard to show that some person or group should be considered
"trustworthy,"29 for example, but we still go about doing so by breaking
down the meaning of that term and amassing evidence based on human
experience, which we have in common as citizens. Even nonrational secular
premises, although perhaps not strictly provable, at least operate through
reference inward rather than outward. Basing law expressly on religious faith,
on the other hand, involves pointing toward a source of value that people can
share not as United States citizens, but only as citizens in the kingdom of the
same God. When religious believers enact laws for the express purpose of
advancing the values believed to be commanded by their religion, they exclude
nonbelievers from meaningful participation in political discourse and from
meaningful access to the source of normative authority predicating law.30
They force their "reference out" on others, disempowering nonbelievers. For
this reason, it is proper to insist that law be grounded expressly in sources of
value accessible to citizens as citizens, not merely to those citizens who
happen to share a faith in a separate, extrahuman source of authority.3
Some scholars have suggested that a law should withstand Establishment
Clause challenge if a plausible secular purpose can be articulated on its
behalf.32 Thus, laws requiring school prayer would be held to violate the
Establishment Clause because their only plausible purpose is religious, while
laws banning abortion would never violate that clause-regardless of the
reasons actually advanced in support of the laws. The argument that a law with
a plausible secular purpose should be upheld is often packaged with the
29. Cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 12, at 63; RICHARDS, supra note 23, at 76.
30. See GREENAWALT, supra note 12, at 216-17; see also Greenawalt, supra note 24, at 1031 ("There
is... no interpersonal way in which the weight of personal experience is to be assessed. If a law were
based largely on religious beliefs that were mainly confirmed by personal experiences, those who had not
shared in the experience might understand why the law had been adopted, but to them, there would be no
reasoned basis on which they would be able to conclude that the law was sound."); id. at 1035 ("If political
argument were comprised largely of debate about the meaning of particular biblical passages, those who
did not believe in the same kind of authoritativeness for biblical passages would be bound to feel
excluded.").
31. See Ingber, supra note 25, at 285 ("The obligations imposed by religion are of a different, higher
nature than those derived from human relationships; they are not part of the agenda of public debate.");
cf. Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1075, 1077 (1986)
("Perhaps implicit in the idea of a liberal democracy ... is an obligation of ... an official to rely on
reasons not that necessarily are held by all of the people, but that could be held by all of the people.
Religious argument, to the extent that it intrinsically appeals to and includes those who share common
religious presuppositions while simultaneously excluding those who do not subscribe to certain religious
tenets, may very well fail this test. Religious argument may ultimately require addressees of the argument
either to disagree or to give up their religious faith, in a way that secular argument in the realm of the
nonrational does not. Religious decisionmaking by an official, therefore, may be of a different order than
other forms of choosing between courses of action, even on nonrational grounds, and for that reason
religious decisionmaking may be inconsistent with the obligations of an official in a liberal democracy.").
32. The reasons advanced for this test vary considerably. Thus, while Steven Smith urges the test as
part of an argument to permit religiously backed law, see Smith, Separation, supra note 19, at 1004-05,
Kathleen Sullivan-who builds a case against religiously backed law-urges the test to avoid the perils of
inquiry into legislative motivation, see Sullivan, supra note 6, at 197 n.9.
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argument that individual citizens must be able to rely on their religious values
in forming political views.33 People taking this position stress that so long as
a law has a plausible secular purpose, it can be accepted even by those who
don't share the relevant religious faith, while the religious believers can still
rely in the political process on the religious values that they hold most dear.
I believe this argument to be an important mistake. I have no quarrel with
citizens and legislators relying on their religious beliefs when they form
political positions or when they decide how to vote (for laws or for
representatives). The problem arises when the legislature appears to be
captured by adherents to a particular religious faith-more specifically, when
a law appears to have been passed because of a sectarian religious concern.'
Even those who argue for sustaining legislation with a plausible secular
purpose would agree that a religious sect (I use the term broadly) may not
require all citizens to engage in a religious practice that is specific to that sect.
A Jewish majority in a town, for instance, cannot require that all citizens light
Sabbath candles on Friday night. In my view, it is just as problematic for
adherents to a religious faith to forbid abortions, say, if they make clear in the
relevant political fora that their reason for enacting the ban is their belief that
God condemns abortion.35 A nonbeliever is effectively denied participation
in the political process because the nonbeliever cannot discuss the matter on
the terms that the religious believers have set; the nonbeliever has no (current)
access to those terms, no way of evaluating an argument made on expressly
religious terms. For the same reason, however, I see no problem if the
religious believers are willing to translate their religious source of value into
secular terms, because then the nonbeliever perceives that she can participate
in the debate.36
33. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 25, at 195, 203.
34. See Greenawalt, supra note 24, at 1022 (arguing that legislators can rely on religious sources in
forming their judgments, but that "[c]ivility and respect for minorities counsel that public advocacy be
conducted in the nonreligious language of shared premises and modes of reasoning").
35. Cf. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 565-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 13, 30-33 (1992). In discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Laurence Tribe once suggested
that the Establishment Clause should be read to invalidate legislation when "the involvement of religious
groups in the political process surrounding a subject of governmental control is convincingly traceable, as
it is in the case of abortion, to an intrinsic aspect of the subject itself in the intellectual and social history
of the period." Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 25 (1973) (footnote omitted). Tribe has since
changed his mind, stating that his prior view "appears to give too little weight to the value of allowing
religious groups freely to express their convictions in the political process, underestimates the power of
moral convictions unattached to religious beliefs on this issue, and makes the unrealistic assumption that
a constitutional ruling could somehow disentangle religion from future public debate on the question."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 1350 (2d ed. 1988) (footnotes omitted); see also
id. at 1211 (criticizing strict secular-purpose requirement).
36. Michael McConnell has made a strong argument that the "no endorsement of religion" test now
fashionable among some on the Court is not a workable Establishment Clause test. See McConnell, supra
note 8, at 147-57. But to the extent that the test is helpful, it is because "endorsement of religion" is
precisely what happens when a legislative majority relies expressly on its religious faith to ground law.
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Imagine, for example, legislators arguing for the banning of abortions
"because they're immoral." If pressed in debate, assume that the legislators
explain that they (a) have observed human suffering, (b) distinguish human
beings from animals because of the language abilities of the former, (c) are
concerned about slippery slopes, and (d) resolve close questions in favor of
preserving life. That sort of response is quite different from the response of
legislators who say, "We believe in Christ as Lord, and His scriptures say that
life is sacred, and therefore abortion is wrong." Nonbelievers can have a
dialogue with the former legislators based on sharable observations and
conclusions about human experience; with the latter legislators, a nonbeliever
might reasonably feel muted by the reference to the legislators' God and the
claim of authority based in an extrahuman power.
Take another example: Suppose Person A says that the oil companies run
the United States and that therefore we should enact law X. Although Person
A's premise might appear not based in reason, we can at least try to get to the
bottom of it by examining standard sources of information about the influence
of oil companies. Now suppose Person B says that Christ is God and taught
Y and that therefore we should enact law Z. Nonbelievers can't try to "get to
the bottom of it"; precisely because they are not believers, the premise is not
currently available to them for evaluation.
Requiring that laws have an express secular purpose rather than merely a
plausible one might transform the legislative process in a way consistent with
the dictates of the Establishment Clause.37 In some cases, the same laws will
be passed that otherwise would have been passed, but pursuant to secular
rather than religious argument.38 In other cases, the unavailability of a strong
secular argument will mean that a law will not be passed. This transformation
of the legislative process will eliminate the Establishment Clause injury of
excluding nonbelievers from meaningful participation in the political process.
That we see so many laws passed on the basis of secular argumentation, when
religious arguments no doubt are stronger in the souls and minds of many
Conversely, one might argue that certain laws are legitimate even though originally based on enacting faithinto law, because now most people understand the law's dominant purpose to be secular. In these cases,the original religious purpose becomes embedded, as it were, in the long-standing practice, and the secular
purpose rises to dominance. See Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence
of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 997, 1004 (1986). This is how one can justify
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), in which the Court upheld laws requiring businesses to beclosed on Sunday. Central to upholding state action in this category is that the practice at issue be generally
perceived today as secular rather than religious. So although Michael McConnell might be correct to statethat the pretty lights on Michigan Avenue in Chicago have religious significance, that "most of us do notrecognize the symbolism" is the more important observation. See McConnell, supra note 8, at 189.37. Cf. John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the
Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REv. 847, 894-95 (1984).
38. This is similar to the administrative-law doctrine requiring remand to an agency if it relied uponan improper reason, but permitting the agency to reach the same substantive result on different grounds.
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
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legislators, is testament not to the fact that the Establishment Clause
proscription on enacting faith into law will have little real-world effect, but
rather to the fact that it is already having such an effect.
Let me explain why I have not suggested forbidding laws based on an
underlying religious purpose as well as those based on an expressly religious
purpose. One can imagine four different situations: (1) a law is religious on its
face; (2) a law not facially religious is enacted for an expressly religious
purpose; (3) a law not facially religious is enacted for an expressly secular
purpose that appears to be a pretext for the real purpose, which is religious;
and (4) a law not facially religious is enacted for an expressly secular purpose
that does not appear pretextual, but the real underlying purpose is religious.
The first three types of law should be invalid under the Establishment Clause
because they foreclose meaningful political participation by nonbelievers. All
three laws are, in the terminology I am using in this Article, "expressly"
religious. But if religious believers can translate their "true" religious reasons
successfully enough to make it appear to nonbelievers that the secular reasons
are the real ones, then from the nonbelievers' perspective, their political
participation is meaningful. One might argue that to be consistent, I should
condemn even type (4) laws in principle and then acknowledge that the
judiciary can't enforce this condemnation because the true reasons behind the
laws will be inaccessible to it. But my Establishment Clause argument does not
condemn type (4) laws. It turns not on the underlying reasons for laws, but
rather on the reasons that are apparent in the political process. Invalidating
type (3) laws will cover all instances in which believers think they have
successfully masked their true reasons, but have not. If a religious reason can
be successfully translated into a secular one-if a nonbeliever sees the secular
argument as one made in good faith, and finds the ensuing debate
meaningful-then the concern with exclusion from political participation is
eliminated.
We can now return to Sanford Levinson's question: In a liberal democracy,
why aren't all arguments valid in political debate, subject to the possibility that
listeners will reject them (which is likely to occur if the arguments aren't
widely accessible)? The position implicit in this question reflects a
misunderstanding of the role of religion in political debate. Religious
arguments cannot simply be "rejected" by those who don't share the faith of
the people making the arguments. As a non-Christian, I can't meaningfully
debate with a Christian whether certain values do or dQ not stem from her faith
in Jesus Christ. The model of political debate implicit in Levinson's question
fails to address debates that are dominated by an expressly religious position.
In such instances, nonbelievers are not equal participants in the lawmaking
process, for they lack access to the source of normative authority that is
offered as the basis for the law they are told to obey.
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3. The Dominant Express Purpose Test and the Court's Jurisprudence
Many laws will be expressly based not on a single religious or secular
purpose but on an intertwined set of purposes, some religious and some
secular. This is inevitable in a society in which most citizens claim to be
religious. Merely showing that a law was expressly based in part on religious
faith cannot be sufficient to invalidate that law if we accept the fact that many
people are religious and reach conclusions about many issues from religious
premises. But accepting the presence of expressly religious purposes for law
does not require accepting laws that are dominantly based on express
references to religious faith. There is a point at which the mere acknow-
ledgment of the religious values held by many citizens slips into the
establishment of those values as the basis of law. That is the line that a
legislature may not cross. Thus, I would put the test this way: For a law to be
upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge, the law's dominant express
purpose must be secular, and any expressly religious purpose for the law must
be no more than ancillary and not itself dominant. 9
The Court has followed this test, though without stating it clearly and
certainly without explaining which characteristics of "religion" forbid religious
values from being enacted into law. In Epperson v. Arkansas,n0 which struck
down an Arkansas law forbidding the teaching of evolution in public school,
the Court examined the historical context of the law's enactment and
concluded, "It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the
law's reason for existence.",4' In Stone v. Graham,42 the Court summarily
invalidated a Kentucky law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments
on the wall of each public classroom. The legislature had required a notation
on each posting that stated, "The secular application of the Ten Command-
ments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western
Civilization and the Common Law of the United States. 43 The Court
dismissed this notation as pretextual, concluding that the "pre-eminent purpose
for [the law] is plainly religious in nature." 44 Likewise, in Wallace v.
Jaffree,45 the Court struck down an Alabama law authorizing a period of
silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" because it "had no secular
purpose" ;46 as in Epperson, the Court supported this conclusion with
39. For other formulations, see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590-91 (1987) (finding legislation
invalid if backed by "preeminent religious purpose"); id. at 599 (Powell, J., concurring) (observing that
"religious purpose must predominate" for legislation to be invalid).
40. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
41. Id. at 107-08.
42. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
43. Id. at 41.
44. Id.
45. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
46. Id. at 56.
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references to the context of the law's enactment, and in particular to the
legislative history. Finally, in Edwards v. Aguillard,47 the Court invalidated
a Louisiana statute forbidding the teaching of evolution in public school unless
accompanied by the teaching of "creation science." Again after examining the
history of the law's enactment, the Court dismissed the proffered secular
justification of promoting "academic freedom" as pretextual, concluding that
the legislature's "preeminent" purpose was religious.
48
B. Accommodation of Religion
Many laws that appear to advance religion-laws exempting religious
believers from otherwise valid law, for example, or distributing public funds
to religious as well as public institutions-are defended as mere
accommodations of religious practice. In thinking about how to resolve the"accommodation" dilemma under the Establishment Clause, we should focus
on whether the legislature sought expressly to enact faith into law.
Let me begin with the category of nonmandatory legislative exemptions
for religious believers-that is, exemptions that legislatures enact but that
courts would not have required under the Free Exercise Clause, even before
Smith. Such exemptions-say, from the military draft or from laws against
ingesting peyote-would violate the Establishment Clause if their express
purpose were religious. Indeed, some commentators have argued that such
exemptions necessarily reveal a religious purpose and hence violate the
Establishment Clause.49
This argument should be rejected. 0 A legislative exemption for religion
is not necessarily an affirmation of the truth of the religious faith involved.
Rather, the exemption might be based on the secular ground of respect for the
dilemma that would be faced by certain members of the community were they
forced to choose between obeying the commands of law and obeying those of
a separate font of authority. In short, the exemption might be enacted not
47. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
48. Id. at 590-91.
49. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment),
departing from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Steven G. Gey, Why
is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 52 U. PrrT. L. REV. 75, 180-85 (1990); Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27 (1961); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause:
The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 560 (1991); Smith,
Separation, supra note 19, at 991.
50. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Welsh, 398 U.S. at 369 (Vhite, J., dissenting); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 415-16 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in result); McConnell, Update, supra note 10, at 688, 717; Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Note, The
Free Exercise Boundaries of Permissible Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE L.J.
1127 (1990).
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because of religious faith but because of toleration for a belief that happens to
be based in faith.
Thus, I am somewhat perplexed that despite his analysis elsewhere
supporting this position, Michael McConnell suggests in a recent article that
accommodation of a religious practice through a legislative exemption "serves
no 'secular' purpose," manifests a "religious reason," and may even be
comparable to the anti-evolution law at issue in Epperson v. Arkansas.5'
Although McConnell still favors permitting nonmandatory legislative
exemptions, I don't see how this position (with which I agree) is advanced by
claiming that the exemptions serve a religious rather than a secular purpose.
Surely the religious purpose that the Epperson Court found troubling-the
legislature's obvious desire to enact law reflecting the fundamentalist Christian
belief that human beings did not evolve from apes-is different from the
legislative purpose in the standard toleration-exemption case, in which the
legislature accommodates a religious group out of respect for its faith rather
than because the legislature is convinced that the faith is true. To claim that
toleration exemptions in fact reflect a religious rather than secular purpose
seems to me an unhelpful use of the term "religious."
If Smith were overruled or limited, courts would be back in the business
of weighing governmental interest against individual interest to decide whether
to compel religious exemptions from otherwise valid laws under the Free
Exercise Clause. This balancing analysis might resemble the sort of analysis
that a legislature considering toleration exemptions would conduct, but
legislative exemptions might still be permissible even when a court would not
require them under the Free Exercise Clause. For one thing, courts often defer
to legislative judgment in striking such balances, in part because legislatures
hold an advantage over courts in assessing the strength of governmental
interests. In addition, while the legislature may not give a governmental
interest more weight than a court would, it may give that interest less weight
than a court would. To be sure, there might be some cases in which granting
an exemption would be such a heavy and disproportionate burden on the
governmental interest in universal obedience to a particular law that the
argument that the legislature was merely acting out of respect for certain
members of the community might appear pretextual, revealing an illegitimate
purpose to advance religious faith. But to say as a categorical matter that
legislative exemptions not compelled by the Free Exercise Clause reflect such
a purpose is to neglect the distinction between toleration and religious
purpose.52
51. McConnell, supra note 8, at 128-31 & n.83.
52. In this paragraph, I agree with Michael McConnell, see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation
of Religion, 1985 SUP. Cr. REv. 1, 31; McConnell, Update, supra note 10, at 709-12, and disagree with
Jonathan Nuechterlein, see Nuechterlein, supra note 50, at 1128-29, 1143.
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The accommodation issue is not confined to the exemption cases.
Legislatures often seek to benefit a particular secular interest and include
religious institutions as direct or indirect beneficiaries. In Everson v. Board of
Education,53 for example, the Court upheld a statute authorizing school
districts to expend funds for sending children to school on public buses,
whether the children went to public schools or to nonprofit private schools and
whether the private schools were secular or religious. Likewise, in Walz v. Tax
Commission54 the Court permitted a state to authorize property-tax
exemptions to nonprofit institutions generally, including churches. In both
Everson and Walz, there was no indication that the program was enacted to
advance the tenets of a particular religious faith. Rather, these cases involved
general legislative programs that were not related to religion, but that included
religious institutions incidentally because those institutions shared a relevant
nonreligious attribute with secular institutions. I do not discuss here whether
and when the mere effect of benefiting a religious institution should be held
to violate the Establishment Clause. My point is simply that the core
Establishment Clause prohibition on enacting faith into law is not violated in
these cases.55
C. Objections to Forbidding Laws from Having a Dominant Express
Religious Purpose
Here, I respond to the following claims: (1) that the inquiry I advocate
improperly chills legislators' expression; (2) that we can distinguish laws
prescribing religious practices from those dealing with secular subject matter;
(3) that the Establishment Clause does not limit the values that may be used
to ground law, but requires only institutional separation between government
and religion; (4) that forbidding the enactment of religious faith into law
implies that the offered faith is false, which is itself a religious position; and
(5) that barring religious values as grounds for law improperly disadvantages
religion.
1. Inquiry into Legislative Purpose Improperly Chills Legislators'
Expression.
Steven Smith, who opposes the secularization of law, argues that
overturning laws because the legislators who enacted them expressed religious
53. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
54. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
55. Cf. id. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring); Greenawalt, supra note 25, at 795; Mansfield, supra note
37, at 878; McConnell, supra note 52, at 14-15; Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373, 395; Weiss, supra note 26, at 617. But see Sullivan,
supra note 6, at 208-14.
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purposes "raises a potentially serious threat to the freedom of expression of
legislators who hold religious beliefs. 56 Kathleen Sullivan, who supports the
secularization of law, similarly contends that "an articulable secular rationale
is all that is required; a requirement of secular motivation trenches too far on
the freedoms of conscience and expression of citizens and legislators.""7 Both
Smith and Sullivan appear concerned that an Establishment Clause
jurisprudence that uses legislative statements as evidence of impermissible
purpose will deter legislators from speaking their minds and perhaps induce
them to alter their beliefs, thus infringing upon freedom of expression and
religion.
These concerns are misdirected. When we use statements as evidence of
illegitimate legislative purpose, we are not punishing the speaker for the beliefs
or opinions she holds. Rather, we are using the statements in a merely
evidentiary fashion. The speaker can believe or speak whatever she wants
without fear of punishment. If she explicitly attempts to turn her beliefs into
law that will bind her fellow citizens, however, she has gone beyond mere
belief or expression.
This analysis is similar to the argument supporting the use of, say, an
employer's racist statements as evidence in a job-discrimination case. An
employer is entitled to believe whatever she wants about the race of her
employees, and with some exceptions she also is entitled to say whatever she
wants about their race. 8 But if she fires a black employee and the employee
brings a race-discrimination suit, the employee may introduce into evidence
statements made by the employer that indicate racial bias. The law that gives
the employee a cause of action doesn't restrict the employer's beliefs or
expression, but only the action of firing the employee illegitimately.5 9
Similarly, a rule forbidding laws expressly based on religious faith doesn't
forbid adherence to that faith; it just forbids advancing that faith as the reason
for law. If this forces legislators to refrain from advocating a religious purpose
for legislation and to find a secular analogue for that purpose-both of which
involve masking a reason for which they believe the law should be
56. Smith, Separation, supra note 19, at 994.
57. Sullivan, supra note 6, at 197 n.9.
58. Some lawsuits charging workplace harassment do rely directly on speech. Although the Court in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992), said without serious analysis that such harassment
actions do not run afoul of the free-speech guarantee against content-based laws, there is a substantial
question whether verbal-harassment actions based on statutes that single out certain attributes for protection
(such as race or gender) are consistent with the reasoning in R.A.V.
59. It is precisely this evidentiary use of speech that distinguishes the type of hate-speech statute
invalidated by the Court in R.A.V from the type of hate-crimes statute improperly invalidated by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 810
(1992). Hate-speech laws punish speech directly for its hateful quality; a statement about the race of the
addressee is punished because of the harm that the statement itself causes. Wisconsin's hate-crimes law,
by contrast, stepped up punishments for crimes when the victim was selected on the basis of race (or other
specified characteristics); a statement about the victim's race would be used simply as evidence that the
defendant selected the victim because of her race.
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passed-then the Establishment Clause value of preventing the passage of lawexpressly based on values available only to some citizens will have been
advanced.6
2. We Can Distinguish Laws Prescribing Religious Practices from Those
Dealing with Secular Subject Matter
The argument for upholding laws that have a plausible secular purposerather than insisting upon an express secular purpose can be recast as anargument for invalidating only laws that address inherently religious subjects.Thus, a law requiring the wearing of a cross would be invalid while a lawbanning abortion would not, regardless of the reasons advanced in support ofsuch laws; there is no plausible secular purpose for the former law, while thereare plausible secular purposes for the latter law. This argument proceeds fromthe premise that the central purpose of the religion clauses is to protect
religious liberty and to avoid government coercion of religion. As MichaelMcConnell puts it, "[T]he government may not interfere with a person'schosen religious belief and practice by prohibiting it or by exerting power orinfluence in favor of any faith.' So long as the content of a law is notinherently religious, the argument goes, no religious coercion has taken place,even if the majority that approved the law was persuaded by a religious
argument.
But religious arguments for otherwise secular laws risk rendering religiousboth the debate over those laws and their social meaning. When a religiousperson argues that abortion should be banned because that is God's will,abortion is no longer secular for her or for those who engage her on herreligious terms. Its existence-and its proposed nonexistence-have beentransmuted into something religious. If an anti-abortion bill is advanced for theexpress purpose of enacting a value believed to be commanded by religion,then abortion is a religious matter for the legislators who rely on the religious
60. Cf. Schauer, supra note 31, at 1075-76 (observing that Establishment Clause might be read toforbid government officials from doing things as officials that they might be permitted to do as citizens,because officials have "positional duties" that require them to rely on secular rather than religious reasonsin carrying out their obligations).61. McConnell, supra note 52, at 1; see also McConnell, Update, supra note 10, at 690 (noting thatreligion clauses protect against "two equal and opposite threats to religious freedom-government actionthat promotes the majority's favored brand of religion and government action that impedes religiouspractices not favored by the majority"); McConnell, supra note 8, at 117 ("[The purpose of the ReligionClauses is to protect the religious lives of the people from unnecessary intrusions of government, whetherpromoting or hindering religion."); id. at 136 ("The overriding objective of the Religion Clauses was torender the new federal government irrelevant to the religious lives of the people."); id. at 169 (definingappropriate judicial inquiry as: "[I1s the purpose or probable effect to increase religious uniformity, eitherby inhibiting religious practice ... or by forcing or inducing a contrary religious practice .... withoutsufficient justification? The baseline for these judgments is the hypothetical world in which individualsmake decisions about religion on the basis of their own religious conscience, without the influence ofgovernment.").
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argument and might therefore become a religious matter for those seeking to
defeat the bill. Furthermore, if the bill is enacted pursuant to the religious
arguments, then the legal obligations imposed by the new law become
endowed with religious significance. As a result, imposing legal duties based
expressly on the dictates of a religious faith does amount to "exerting power
or influence in favor of [that] faith.
62
3. The Establishment Clause Does Not Limit the Values that May Be
Used to Ground Law, but Requires Only Institutional Separation
Betweetz Government and Religion.
Others have maintained that the Establishment Clause was intended only
to ensure separation between government and religious institutions, and that
enacting law on the basis of religious faith does not threaten institutional
separation.6' But these categories collapse. Laws advancing faith tend-albeit
insidiously, slowly, and incrementally-to establish government as a religious
institution.64 In other words, there is more than one way to establish a church.
Funneling religious faith into a pattern of legal obligations and rights would,
in the extreme case in which all aspects of the faith were turned into law,
convert the state into the church. Of course we all agree that the government
may not require worship, prayer, and the like. Butpartial establishment should
be just as forbidden as complete establishment. When legislation is expressly
based on religious arguments, the legislation takes on a religious character, to
the frustration of those who don't share the relevant religious faith and who
therefore lack access to the normative predicate behind the law. In short, to
ensure that law is part of the civil government and not the church
establishment, it is crucial that the express purposes for law be secular rather
than religious.
62. Also, as Ira Lupu has explained, coercion does not exhaust the content of the Establishment
Clause, which protects not only against laws that coerce citizens to follow a particular religion but also
against laws that deliberately support some religions and not others. See Lupu, supra note 49, at 576-80.
This value of "equal religious liberty," as Lupu calls it, see id. at 567, is endangered by legislation that is
expressly based on the commands of a particular religious faith.
63. See Smith, Separation, supra note 19; Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 19; Smolin, supra note
20.
64. Steven Smith, the primary proponent of the view that the Establishment Clause requires only
institutional separation, describes the argument against his view fairly well, without (to my view)
sufficiently rebutting it. See Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 19, at 184 ("[I]f government relies upon
religious beliefs in formulating public policies, the resulting policies require conformity to what some
citizens may regard as religious programs or agendas .... Such compulsion can be viewed as imposing,




4. Forbidding the Enactment of Religious Faith into Law Implies that the
Offered Faith Is False, Which Is Itself a Religious Position.
One might argue that all sides in a political debate in which religious
values are raised necessarily take a position on the truth of those values and
hence of that religion, and that therefore it is impossible to carve the legislative
world into religious and secular purposes. According to this argument, if a
legislator is apprised of the claim of religious truth animating a particular bill,
and if the legislator votes against the bill, the legislator will have taken the
position that the religious claim is false. This position, too, is religious, or so
the argument goes.
I have two responses. First, the idea that rejection of a political argument
based on a claim of religious truth necessarily implies rejection of that claim
of truth is relevant only when the claim of religious truth is made known to
the nonbelievers; I have already explained why such a claim should not be part
of public political discussion to begin with. Second, it is not true that voting
against a bill backed by a claim of religious faith necessarily involves taking
a position on the truth of that religion. Merely being aware that a position is
inconsistent with a particular claim of religious truth doesn't make that position
itself religious, just as being aware that there is a secular analogue to a
religious claim doesn't make that claim secular. In other words, after rational
discourse, when the opponent of a bill proffered from religious faith is made
aware that her position is consonant with a particular religious position (i.e.,
the denial of the truth of that faith), she might still justify her vote with secular
arguments, not because she denies the truth of the religious faith. That she is
aware of a consistency between her position and a religious position does not
necessarily mean that she votes the way she does because of the religious
position or that she expresses her position in religious terms. So, although
David Smolin might be correct in stating that "government officials cannot act
without reliance on implicit moral and factual assumptions that derive from
various competing religious views, ' 65 "implicit" and "derive from" are not the
same as "explicit" and "are expressly meant to advance." Legislative action for
the express purpose of either advancing or denying a claim of religious truth
is different from legislative action for the express purpose of advancing or
denying a claim that is considered secular.
What about the legislator who does vote a certain way in order to deny a
claim of religious truth? "If the establishment clause is understood as barring
government from sponsoring claims of truth in the domain of religion," Kent
Greenawalt suggests, "then antireligious ideas may be understood as a subset
of religious ideas. 66 But we must be careful to distinguish between
65. Smolin, supra note 20, at 1091.
66. Greenawalt, supra note 25, at 793 (footnotes omitted). Ned Foley has written to me in a similar
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Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause concerns. It certainly would
violate the Free Exercise Clause for a legislature to harm religion directly by
seeking to deny a claim of religious truth-say, by banning religious worship
services. Yet banning religious worship services would violate the Free
Exercise Clause regardless of why the legislature chose to do so. The
Establishment Clause is relevant as a distinct source of limitation on
government because it prohibits the use of legislation to impose obligations
based expressly on the affirmation of an extrahuman source of values. The
relevant question here is whether a predicate such as "God doesn't exist" could
itself be the source of values animating the passage of law. But except when
considering a bill that would directly harm religion (which is covered under
the Free Exercise Clause), it would be odd for legislators to say: "God doesn't
exist, and so we're going to enact the following law." Presumably a law that
denies certain religious truths would also accept other values as true, and
presumably the dominant express purpose of such a law would be the
advancement of those other values rather than the mere denial of the religious
ones.
For example, say the federal government enacted a military draft and in
doing so expressly denied that any extrahuman source of value prohibits all
killing. Such a denial, though it might be an aspect of legislative purpose,
could not logically be the dominant express purpose for the draft law. Instead,
the dominant express purpose of the draft law presumably would involve
secular arguments about the need to provide a national defense, and such
arguments are not themselves "claims of truth in the domain of religion." The
imposition of legal obligations stems from the acceptance of a source of value,
not from the mere denial that another source of value (extrahuman or not)
exists.
5. Barring Religious Values as Grounds for Law Improperly
Disadvantages Religion.
Finally, a religious person might object that barring her values from being
enacted into law improperly excludes her from full participation in politics, for
she might derive normative authority solely from her religious faith. The
religious person might accept the requirement of finding a secular analogue for
her religious values, if doing so permits law to coincide with what she deems
the correct values. But if she considers this requirement a restriction on her
political participation, then we must recognize that whether we permit or forbid
religious values to ground law, someone will be excluded from full political
participation: either the secular person, because she lacks access to the faith
vein that perhaps the Establishment Clause "should be understood as precluding the government's reliance
on any beliefs that lie on the plane of theology."
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enacted into law, or the religious person, because her faith has been cordoned
off. In either case, it would be appropriate to offset this exclusion by requiring
exemptions from law. Strictly speaking, we could try to run a system in which
law could be used to advance religious faith, and in which those who do not
share that faith could receive exemptions. But this approach seems odd in a
nation that forbids government from making any law respecting an
establishment of religion. It is more consistent with the Establishment
Clause-and it allows us to give full meaning to the Free Exercise Clause, as
I discuss in Part II-to bar religion from grounding law but to require
exemptions for those whose religions forbid obedience to such law.
11. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE EXEMPTIONS AS A POLITICAL COUNTERWEIGHT
TO ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DISABILITIES
The Smith position against exemptions implicitly treats religious values as
playing a full and uninhibited role in politics. If we insist upon a more limited
role for religious values, then we eliminate the predicate for Smith's aversion
to Free Exercise Clause exemptions. As I show in Part 1(A), if the rules of the
political game set by the Establishment Clause place a special disability on
religious values-a disability that is not placed on secular values-then there
is a powerful case for such exemptions. The religious conscientious objector
can now justifiably claim not only that her religion forbids her from obeying
the law in question but also that she was excluded from seeking to enact into
law the values of that religious faith. Because the person advancing religious
faith as a source of value has not been treated as a full participant in the
political process, the Free Exercise Clause should be construed to require at
least prima facie exemptions from law's obligation. In Part 1(B), I discuss
how this offset between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
works, and explain that merely permitting accommodation of religion as an act
of legislative toleration is insufficient to offset the Establishment Clause
burden. In Part II(C), I discuss whether Free Exercise Clause exemptions can
be justified absent the predicate of an Establishment Clause burden. Finally,
in Part II(D), I explain that not every value excluded from politics deserves
protection from politics through exemptions.
A. The Need for an Offset
In the lawmaking process, we are free to make political, moral, and
philosophical arguments to support our positions. But the central point of the
Establishment Clause argument made above is that the lawmaking process in
a nontheistic government should not involve appeals to religious faith. In fact,
one principal feature that distinguishes a country like ours from theocracies is
the preclusion of law based expressly on religion. Religious belief goes a step
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beyond standard measures of justification for law: It involves a leap of faith
to an extrahuman source of value. One can try to persuade others to take the
same leap (by evangelizing and proselytizing, say), but the ultimate leap that
religious argument calls for is different from what political, moral, or
philosophical argument demands. Because of this difference, the latter should
be part of public political justification; the former should not.
Enter the Free Exercise Clause. Lawmaking is a "contractual" process in
the sense that if the political, moral, or philosophical arguments that we favor
fail to attract enough support, we are bound by the resulting law even if it
violates our political, moral, or philosophical sensibilities. Part of losing-of
being the minority on an issue-is having to obey the law or to suffer the
consequences. But precisely because we should exclude religious faith from
being the express basis for law, an appeal to faith as the ground for a
constitutional right of conscientious objection does not violate the "contractual"
premise of obedience once one loses. The person basing a claim of conscience
on faith hasn't lost the "faith argument" on the political playing field; if the
process went as it should have, that argument was never allowed onto the
playing field.
Sometimes the position that religious faith should be kept out of law is
understood to forbid all legislative exemptions for religion.67 On this view,
we separate religion from civil government by denying it recognition as the
basis either for law or for exemptions from law. This position secures a sort
of facial or formal "neutrality." But if we preclude faith from being the express
purpose behind law, then exemptions are required to compensate religious
people for the obstacle that this disability poses to their participation in the
democratic process. Just as we grant special judicial protection to discrete and
insular minorities who are effectively excluded from political power,6 and
just as we enhance judicial scrutiny when legislation blocks the channels of
political change,69 so should we recognize the need for religious exemptions
from laws created by a process that is closed in an important way to religious
people.
Thus, the Free Exercise Clause can be seen as providing a political
counterweight to the Establishment Clause. If the latter should be read to
prevent law from being based expressly on religious faith, then the former
should be construed to make religious faith a ground for avoiding the
obligations of law. In other words, a religious person can justifiably say,
67. See Kurland, supra note 49, at 7; Marshall, Defense, supra note 7, at 326; Marshall, Case Against,
supra note 7, at 397. But see Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Cr. REv. 11,
13.
68. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
69. For an extensive elaboration on this theme, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT
(1980).
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"You're keeping my religion out of your politics, now keep your politics out
of my religion."
This argument permits "religion" to mean the same thing in the Free
Exercise Clause that it means in the Establishment Clause. That is as it should
be, for the word appears only once in the First Amendment: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . .. ,,70 The text strongly indicates that "religion" was meant
to refer to the same thing in both clauses.7 '
The text also indicates that religion was meant to be special. Readings that
mush religious values together with secular ones and result in a watered-down
Establishment Clause ("all values may compete as the ground of law") or a
beefed-up Free Exercise Clause ("secular and religious conscientious objection
should be treated the same")72 do not take "religion" seriously as something
special and different-and thus worthy of two constitutional clauses all its
own. Instead, both clauses treat religion as special because it must be separate
from normal politics: Just as we should reduce the role of religious faith in
imposing legal obligations on those who don't share the faith, so should we
expand the role of religious faith in grounding exemptions from otherwise
valid laws.
Thus, although I agree with Steven Smith that "religion's truly distinctive
qualities inhere ... in its religious or spiritual dimensions, 73 I disagree with
him that we must therefore treat religious faith as a source of normative
authority for our politics that can play a full role in grounding law. Unlike the
religionists, who deem all sources of value equally part of politics, my claim
is that "references out" have an (often unintentional) effect similar to children's
taunts of "I know something you don't know," and should be given a reduced
role in politics because of the way in which they exclude nonbelievers. On the
other hand, unlike the secularists, who argue that Free Exercise Clause
exemptions would unjustifiably privilege religion,74 I take religion seriously
as special here, too, and would require exemptions precisely because the
premise of the no-exemptions position-that one must obey the result of
politics in which one has been given full opportunity to participate-should no
longer apply.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). But see
RICHARDS, supra note 23, at 145.
72. On the latter point, see infra Part III.
73. Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 19, at 219.
74. See Kurland, supra note 49, at 7; Marshall, Defense, supra note 7, at 326; Marshall, Case Against,
supra note 7, at 397.
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B. How the Offset Works
It might seem that exemptions are necessary only when religious
arguments actually are advanced and excluded from legislative debate. But if
we take seriously the exclusion of religious arguments from politics, then we
have altered a religious person's ability to participate in politics across the
board and not just in specific instances. In response to this wholesale exclusion
of expressly religious arguments from politics, a religious person may
legitimately claim exemption from laws that burden her religious practice,
regardless of whether she was in fact precluded from making a religious
argument in the debates that led to the particular law that is now seen as
burdensome. So, for example, even if the members of the Native American
Church in Smith did not actually participate in the debate leading to Oregon's
controlled-substance laws, they should still be able to claim a prima facie
exemption from those laws as applied to the sacramental ingestion of peyote.
This result holds in part because of a counterfactual: Had those practitioners
of Peyotism entered the legislative debates, they should have been precluded
from urging their eligious values as a source of law. Even apart from the
counterfactual, the members of the Native American Church may legitimately
argue, "You have precluded us generally from urging our religious values as
a source of law; therefore, you should generally permit us to claim exemptions
from laws that burden our religion."
It is easy to see how a religious minority might be burdened by an
otherwise valid law: Because the incidental, unintended effects of the law do
not burden the majority, members of the majority are less likely to tailor the
law to prevent such incidental burdens on the minority. But one might suggest
that we sufficiently compensate minority religions for any Establishment
Clause burden by giving legislatures the discretion-not the obligation-to
enact toleration-based exemptions. If we exclude religious faith from grounding
law, the argument would go, then we offset this burden by permitting the
burdened group to argue for an accommodation of its religious practice.
The ability to argue for a toleration-based exemption is insufficient
compensation for the Establishment Clause burden because members of the
minority religion still are prevented from urging more general legislation to
advance their beliefs. Consider a state in which marijuana use is a crime. As
noted above, a decriminalization law could be based on the desirability of
tolerating a religious group whose faith compels such use. But it could not be
based expressly on the idea that the faith of that religion is true and that
therefore marijuana use should not be criminal.75 This exclusion removes
75. Although there might be no plaintiff with standing sufficient to challenge such a law, I amassuming that legislators will act pursuant to proper constitutional norms and that the Establishment Clause
argument made in Part I is a proper constitutional norm.
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some arrows from the religious group's quiver; religious faith as such has been
disabled as an express source of law. The disability is sufficiently substantial
that if marijuana use is not decriminalized, the fact that the members of the
religion may still ask for an exemption from the criminal law isn't sufficient
to compensate for the burden of not being able to urge the truth of their faith
itself as a reason to decriminalize the drug. There are situations in which a
general repeal of the law might be the religious group's only shot, because a
more limited exemption would not pass.
The facts of Smith and of this hypothetical case, however, suggest another
objection. Are we really disabling the members of the minority religion by
excluding religious faith from grounding law? If there was no chance that the
minority could have enacted its faith into law, isn't the disability ephemeral?
It is true that many cases about Free Exercise Clause exemptions involve
minority religions that would have been hard pressed to garner majority
support for enacting their faith into law. But the Establishment Clause
argument advanced here still excludes certain values from grounding law, and
in particular it prohibits a minority religion from seeking to persuade the
majority that it should enact a law because the minority faith is the true one.
Furthermore, legislation often passes even if backed by less than "the
majority"; smaller groups often capture the legislature for particular programs,
and the arguments of such small groups-although insufficient to carry the day
alone-might in some cases be enough to tip the legislative balance. If we are
forbidding religious faith from playing even this incremental role, then the
proper compensation is to construe the Free Exercise Clause as requiring
exemptions from laws that burden religion.
So far my examples have focused on minority religions. But suppose that
a member of a religious majority in the relevant jurisdiction claims a Free
Exercise Clause exemption from an otherwise valid law. Here, it is easy to see
how the Establishment Clause disability might have harmed members of the
majority religion by shifting the way in which favored legislation could be
enacted. But one might wonder how it is possible that a law could have the
incidental effect of burdening the majority. Wouldn't the majority have
prevented the enactment of such a law, or secured the law's repeal?
Again, this view of the legislative process is too simple. Many laws might
impose on religious practice burdens not initially recognized as such or simply
unanticipated; furthermore, legislation might be passed by a small faction
capturing the legislature. For a variety of reasons, members of the majority
religion might have insufficient legislative capital to alter such laws, which
might be seen as producing good results apart from the burden on religious
practice. Arguing that majority religions would never enact law that burdens
their faith, like arguing that minority religions could never enact their faith into
law, takes too simple a view of a process that often results in laws enacted
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because of a strong push by a small group and in laws with unintended effects
that prove hard to undo because of the laws' concomitant benefits.
Let me offer some more specific examples of how the offset might work.
(Note at the outset that under Smith, Free Exercise Clause exemptions would
not be required in any of the following situations.) First, consider Epperson v.
Arkansas,76 in which the Court invalidated a law forbidding the teaching of
evolution in public school. There wasn't much of a secular argument for
banning such teaching; the obvious purpose of the law was to advance the
religious faith of those who believed in creationism rather than evolution. By
striking the law down, the Court sent a signal that law cannot be grounded in
express or otherwise obvious religious purposes. But what if the parents who
supported the law sincerely claimed that their religious faith prohibited their
children from being taught evolution in the science portion of their public
school classes? Under my calculus, they should be entitled to a Free Exercise
Clause right (at least prima facie)77 to remove their children from class during
the portions of instruction that violate their religious principles. This prima
facie exemption would arise precisely because parents are not allowed to rely
on their religious faith to dictate the curriculum of the public schools.78
Next, assume a world without Roe v. Wade,7 9 and imagine a state with
a Catholic majority. Under the view of the Establishment Clause advanced
above, the legislature may not ban abortion if the express purpose is to reflect
a Catholic view of when life begins. Suppose that abortion remains legal. Now
assume that there is a general law compelling doctors to treat indigent patients
for all legal medical procedures. Catholic doctors whose religious faith
condemns abortion should be exempt from having to perform abortions under
this law, because their faith has been removed from the realm of arguments
that may be advanced to outlaw abortion.
Now assume that a state has a law against polygamy, and that under the
Establishment Clause it is improper to repeal the law for the purpose of
advancing a religious faith that requires polygamy (although it would be
permissible to repeal it out of toleration for that faith). Because the
Establishment Clause has altered the political rules in a way that forecloses one
route to removing the legislative burden on that faith, a religious practitioner
of polygamy should receive a prima facie right to exemption from the law.
Finally, assume that a state makes workers who are fired for good cause
ineligible for unemployment compensation. Under my view of the
76. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
77. Here and in the examples that follow, the right to exemption is only prima facie and might be
outweighed by other interests. I do not address how the balance between governmental and individual
interests should be struck. See supra note 4.
78. Cf. Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 647 F Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd and
remanded, 827 F2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
79. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Establishment Clause, a law requiring employers to give employees the
Sabbath off cannot be passed for the express purpose of advancing a particular
religious faith or faiths."0 As a result, a person who is fired for refusing to
work on her Sabbath should be entitled to a prima facie exemption from the
eligibility requirement."'
C. Do Free Exercise Clause Exemptions Make Sense Without an
Accompanying Establishment Clause Burden?
The standard argument for Free Exercise Clause exemptions has nothing
to do with offsetting an Establishment Clause burden. Rather, the argument is
that because members of a majority religion are likely to protect their own
religious practices when writing laws but to ignore (not necessarily
intentionally) the harm that otherwise valid laws cause minority religions, the
Free Exercise Clause should be read to protect minority religions against this
flaw in the political process.8 2
I have two responses to this argument. First, the Court has rejected
precisely this approach to protecting minority interests in the race area. 3
Although the white majority often passes laws that cause unintended
disproportionate harm to blacks, the Court has held that the Equal Protection
Clause requires a showing of discriminatory intent and does not forbid
unintended disparate impact.' This is not the place to discuss the virtues and
vices of this rule. But so long as the rule is on the books, adopting a different
rule for religion requires an argument that religion is different from race in
such a way that disparate impact should be policed. By showing how religion
is special for Establishment Clause purposes, the argument that I advance in
this Article explains why the Free Exercise Clause should be read to require
exemptions from unintended harm without relying on the mere existence of
disparate impact.
Second, and more important, it is unclear why religion deserves special
exemptions from otherwise valid law unless religion must bear an
accompanying burden under the Establishment Clause. What makes religion
special-its reference to an extrahuman source of value-does not of itself
argue for exemptions. That one person's imperative comes from an extrahuman
source of value doesn't distinguish her from a person whose imperative comes
from intrahuman experience, if both are able to urge those values as grounds
80. Cf. Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
81. Cf. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
82. See Laycock, supra note 25, at 1014; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1130-36 (1990); Pepper, supra note 16, at 353; Sullivan, supra
note 6, at 216.
83. See Marshall, Defense, supra note 7, at 320.
84. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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for law.85 The "reference out" that makes religion special becomes relevant
to the Free Exercise Clause calculus only if one sees it as a reason to disable
religion under the Establishment Clause.
D. How Should We Treat Other Values that Are Not Allowed to Back Law?
And now, a clarification. I have argued that when we exclude religious
values from being enacted into law, we should require a compensating
exemption from laws that conflict with those values. This does not mean that
we should require an exemption from an otherwise valid law that conflicts
with racist values (for example) because we have forbidden laws passed with
an expressly racist purpose. The only kind of value that we should protect
from legal obligation because we have excluded it from grounding such
obligation is a value that we otherwise seek to foster when held privately. In
contrast to racist values, we exclude religious values from grounding law not
because we consider the values bad in and of themselves, but because we
consider religious values to be both (a) good things to hold and (b) permissible
as the ground of private decisionmaking but not of law. In this way, the
religion clauses can be seen as establishing the prototypical public/private line:
We exclude religious values from grounding law while including them in the
development of the private self.86 I do not mean to suggest that religious
values cannot be public; they simply cannot be public in the sense that they
provide the express purpose behind law.
HI. DOES THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRE EXEMPTIONS FOR CLAIMS OF
SECULAR CONSCIENCE?
Finally, I want to address the following question: What if someone asks
for an exemption from an otherwise valid law based not on religious faith but
on moral, political, or philosophical values? In this Part, I explain that although
the Constitution should be read to require exemptions for religious conscience,
exemptions for secular conscience should receive no such protection. Unlike
religious values, secular values may be the express source of law. Because
secular values are not excluded from politics, one has no constitutional right
to be exempt from laws based on values that differ from one's own.
85. One could, of course, recast the argument for exemptions to include both religious and secular
conscience. I address this argument in Part IH.
86. John Garvey has argued that religion is somewhat like insanity, for in both cases we exemptsomeone from legal obligations because of the inaccessibility to others of the agent's reasons for action andbecause of the special compulsion felt by the agent in acting contrary to law. See Garvey, supra note 23,at 798-801. We exempt the insane from legal obligation, however, not because we wish to protect theirprivate values, but rather in spite of the fact that we wish their private values (i.e., their insanity) would
go away.
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On several occasions, the Court has indicated that the Free Exercise Clause
does not extend to secular claims of conscience. In United States v. Seeger,87
for example, the Court construed a statute granting conscientious-objector
status to those with religious opposition to war in any form, but not to those
who relied solely on political, sociological, or philosophical considerations.
"These judgments have historically been reserved for the Government," the
Court said, "and in matters which can be said to fall within these areas the
conviction of the individual has never been permitted to override that of the
state."8 Likewise, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,89 the Court stressed the limits on
its decision that the Free Exercise Clause requires that Amish parents and their
children be exempt from compulsory-education laws: "A way of life, however
virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state
regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have
the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious
belief."90 The Court then stated that merely philosophical claims-such as
Thoreau's--could not serve as a basis for exemptions under the religion
clauses. 91 In Thomas v. Review Board,92 part of a line of cases requiring
Free Exercise Clause exemptions from certain requirements in unemployment-
compensation laws for people whose unemployment was caused by their
religious faith,93 the Court added: "Only beliefs rooted in religion are
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special
protection to the exercise of religion."'94 Quoting from Seeger, Yoder, and
Thomas, the Court reached a similar conclusion in Frazee v. Illinois
Department of Employment Security.95
These statements, however, came as dicta, for none of these cases involved
a Free Exercise Clause challenge based on avowedly secular belief.
9 6
Although the Free Exercise Clause refers only to "religion," perhaps the text
merely begins to answer the interpretive question whether the
Constitution-either in the Free Exercise Clause or elsewhere-requires an
exemption from otherwise valid law for conscientious objectors regardless of
the source of their values. Perhaps the Free Exercise Clause is merely the
marker of a constitutional value that extends beyond the text; perhaps a
structural argument can yield a broader right.97
87. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
88. Id. at 173.
89. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
90. Id. at 215.
91. Id. at 216. But see id. at 247-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
92. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
93. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
94. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713.
95. 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989).
96. But cf. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
97. For ways of interpreting the Constitution structurally to find values beyond the text, see CHARLES
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For instance, one might argue that the Framers referred to religion in the
First Amendment because that was the type of belief then being persecuted and
hence in need of protection. The broader concept behind the specific
conception of protecting "religion" could then be seen as the need to protect
all beliefs that are persecuted, and one might base an argument for exemptions
on this sort of concept or principle.98 The most sophisticated effort at such
an argument is that of David A.J. Richards in Toleration and the Constitution.
Richards maintains that toleration is the central constitutional ideal. "[The
state must guarantee and secure to persons a greatest equal respect for the
rational and reasonable capacities of persons themselves to originate, exercise,
express, and change theories of life and how to live it well," he writes. "Thus,
the concerns of the religion clauses are instantiated at every stage in which the
state may bear upon the process of forming such conceptions, the exercise and
expression of such conceptions once achieved, and the changes and revisions
in such conceptions." 99 For Richards, "religion" must be broadly defined, to
include the nontheistic. In fact, to implement fully the concept of government
keeping its hands off the "self-determining moral powers of conscience, ' 1°
religion should be defined relatively "vague[ly]," to include "everything and
anything."'' 1
The answer to this argument follows from the theory developed in Parts
I and II. We ordinarily think of "religion" as including a reference to an
extrahuman source of value. That is what makes religion special. And it is
precisely because of this reference to a source of normative authority that
L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); Ronald Dworkin,
Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381 (1992).
98. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 70-72 (1986); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 218-21 (1980); Lawrence Lessig, The Fidelity in
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming April 1993).
99. RICHARDS, supra note 23, at 136. For similar arguments in the free-speech context, see JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom
of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 204 (1972); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom
of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991).
100. RICHARDS, supra note 23, at x.
101. Id. at 141. For other efforts at protecting secular as well as religious claims of conscience, see
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 464 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); KONVlTZ, supra note 23, at53, 104; Nuechterlein, supra note 50, at 1136 n.54. Whether Richards' concern extends beyond direct
regulation of conscience and to exemptions from laws that only incidentally affect conscience is not clear.
There is great force in Richards' argument that direct governmental interference with conscience, religious
or otherwise, violates basic constitutional norms. Richards bases his objection to such infringement in the
Free Exercise Clause. It might be better, though, to prevent interference with nonreligious conscience under
the Freedom of Speech Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause. Cf. William P. Marshall, Solving the
Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983). The First Amendment
pairs the Free Exercise Clause with the Establishment Clause, and the text suggests that what is "religion"
for the former is "religion" for the latter. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Reading "religion"
broadly to encompass secular claims of conscience risks turning most laws into violations of the
Establishment Clause; if it is improper to base a law on "religion," and "religion" includes secular values,
then how can any law stand? Richards recognizes this problem and avoids it by arguing that "religion"
should be construed more narrowly for Establishment Clause purposes than for Free Exercise Clause
purposes. RICHARDS, supra note 23, at 130, 145. This argument seems to do unnecessary violence to the
First Amendment text.
1642 [Vol. 102: 1611
Religion Clauses
cannot be shared by citizens as citizens that we exclude religious faith from
being enacted into law. In turn, it is because of that exclusion-which is
special to religious values-that the holder of such values can claim religious
exemptions.
Secular values are not so disabled from politics. It is proper, therefore, to
insist that holders of such values learn how to lose as well as win in politics.
The Smith baseline holds for secular values as it does not for religious ones.
Because secular values could have been invoked to ground law, one whose
values lose out in the legislative process must accept defeat and either obey or
become a civil disobedient. Otherwise, laws passed through the democratic
process would be merely hortatory.
Of course, there are many reasons why a civilized society, as a matter of
legislative grace, might wish to grant exemptions fairly readily for claims of
conscience. There is no reason to inflict serious harm (albeit unintended) on
members of the community if exemptions from the offending laws can be
granted without serious disruption to the community as a whole. Moreover, the
community might wish to decrease civil disobedience, and might wish to do
so by granting exemptions rather than expanding the prison population. But all
of these concerns are properly addressed to legislatures; values that may
ground law should not be protected by a constitutional right to an exemption.
Both the legislative and executive branches of government, through exemptions
and through prosecutorial discretion, can be quite tolerant of conscientious
objectors in many contexts and based on many different values. Whether they
ought to be so tolerant should be a political question only.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sometimes we win and sometimes we lose in politics. But so long as we
may participate fully-so long as we are permitted to enact our values into
law-we may not insist on being excused from law's obligation if our
arguments fail. A general scheme of constitutionally compelled exemptions for
claims of conscience would subvert a key predicate of democratic
politics-that losers as well as winners are bound by the values chosen by the
majority.
No doubt operating with this principle in mind, the Court in Employment
Division v. Smith lumped religious values together with secular ones and
permitted no conscience to trump the political process, to become "a law unto
itself." This Article has been an attempt to reveal the fallacy of mixing
religious values together with secular ones, and thus to provide a theory of
constitutionally compelled exemptions for religious conscience. Under the
Establishment Clause, I have argued, law may not be enacted for the express
purpose of advancing the values believed to be commanded by religion. For
religion involves a reference to an extrahuman source of value, which can be
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shared only by believers in the same faith, not by citizens as citizens. Enacting
religious faith into law excludes nonbelievers from the legislative process in
a real and significant way. But if we construe the Establishment Clause to
prohibit legislation enacted for the express purpose of advancing religious
values, then the predicate for universal obedience to law has been removed. A
religious conscientious objector may legitimately claim that because she was
thwarted from offering her values for majority acceptance as law, she should
have at least a prima facie right of exemption from law that conflicts with her
religion. The Free Exercise Clause works as a counterweight to the
Establishment Clause; it gives back what the Establishment Clause takes away.
